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This chapter looks at how Russian society reacted to the conflict in and with 
Ukraine. The active phase of the conflict began in March 2014 with the 
annexation of Crimea and continued with Moscow’s support for the separatist 
movements in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine. The main object of 
interest here is popular views of the conflict and its context, and in particular 
the way these views are conditioned by nationalism and the national identity 
discourse. At the same time, as I show in the first section, it is hardly possible 
to consider ‘public opinion’ as ontologically separate from the public debate 
waged mainly by the elites, as well as from the state’s policies and the way 
they are legitimated. The issue is not just that public opinion is influenced by 
the state propaganda, but that both are part of the same broader discursive 
domain where meaning is constructed and reproduced.
Accordingly, this chapter starts with an analysis of Russian public opinion on 
the conflict and its relationship to the official propaganda. I then go on to 
discuss how the attitudes to Ukraine and the wider assessment of Russian 
foreign policy in recent years are related to the complex ways in which the 
Russian nation is defined and how the concept of the ‘Russian world’ plays 
into the picture. The final section focuses on the broader context of what 
Russians see as Western expansionism and how they justify Russia’s 
conduct in terms of the need to defend the country’s sovereignty and moral 
integrity against Western subversion. It is not my ambition in this chapter to 
present any original analysis of primary sources; rather, I see my task as 
summing up the findings of the existing studies (including my own) and 
highlighting the key issues that have come up in the scholarly debate so far. 
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Russian Public Opinion on Ukraine and the Conflict
Russian society’s response to the conflict in/with Ukraine must be analysed at 
different levels. The most easily accessible type of data are opinion polls. 
These, unsurprisingly, demonstrate that the Russian government enjoys the 
overwhelming support of its population. This phenomenon is most visible 
when it comes to the annexation of Crimea. Around half of the population 
‘definitely’ supports this move, while the total share of positive attitudes has 
consistently remained above 80 per cent (Levada Centre 2016a). Similarly, as 
Denis Volkov (2015) points out, ‘Russians are virtually unanimous (95-96 per 
cent) in denying their own country’s responsibility for anything that’s 
happening in Ukraine: the ongoing conflict, breaches of the Minsk 
Agreements, the shooting down of MH17 etc.’ As highlighted by Lev Gudkov 
(2015b, 35-36), the annexation of Crimea produced a political transition 
among the relatively prosperous urban population, comprising about 20-25 
per cent of the citizenry, who used to distance themselves from the regime 
but now fully support Putin and his foreign policy.
Even though the profound effect of the conflict with Ukraine on Russian public 
opinion is beyond doubt, this fact remains open to vastly different 
interpretations. Thus, Levada Centre scholars tend to explain Russia’s stalled 
transition to democracy in general and the intervention in Ukraine in particular 
by referring to the lingering paternalistic attitudes, imprinted on the political 
culture by the 70 years of the Soviet rule (e.g. Levada 2004; for a critique, 
see Gabovich 2008). This reading implies that, in the final analysis, the role of 
the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian propaganda consisted not so much in shaping 
the preferences of the audience as in voicing, legitimising and radicalising the 
views that the pro-Putin majority had held ever since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. It seems that a similar view is embraced by Ted Hopf in his 
study of the interplay between mass common sense and elites’ views in 
Russia. According to Hopf, while the elites strive to bring the country closer to 
the West, ‘common sense is hindering any Russian movement from the semi-
periphery to the core of Western hegemony’ and thus ‘has an effect on the 
distribution of power in the international system’ (2013, 348). From this 
perspective, the conservative turn in Russian politics after 2012 could be 
interpreted as a result of the elites having finally embraced mass common 
sense. As Volkov (2015) puts it, the ‘propaganda machine can only exploit 
sentiments and fears that are already present’, ‘a mistrust for the West …, the 
passive consumption of television content by the majority of the population, 
and a nostalgia for lost superpower status’ experienced by the typical Homo 
Sovieticus.
At the same time, both Hopf and Gudkov, a leading proponent of the Homo 
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Soveticus theory (see Gudkov 2009), are much more careful in their empirical 
analysis of the ‘Crimean syndrome’. Gudkov, for instance, dismisses the 
implication that ‘Russians have a metaphysical inclination toward 
traditionalism as such’ and explains the surge in nationalism by ‘a perceived 
lack of choice – a lack of alternative sources of authority and alternative ideas 
about the desirable and likely medium- and long-term future of the country’ 
(2015b, 38). Similarly, in a later article, Hopf (2016) offers a more complex 
account of the discursive struggles that led up to the Crimean annexation, 
emphasising the role played by Putin and other leaders, as well as the impact 
of the Western expansion, which most Russians viewed as hostile. 
The elites’ agency comes out as an even more prominent factor in Peter 
Pomerantsev’s influential account of the Kremlin’s tactics: in his view, the goal 
is to infuse the public with a poisonous dose of cynicism by constantly 
exposing conspiracies and corruption – real and imagined – behind all 
political actors and institutions, in Russia and elsewhere, with only the 
Kremlin being immune to such disparagement. The resulting worldview is that 
‘nothing is true and everything is possible’ (Pomerantsev 2015). Nuanced 
studies of public opinion consistently emphasise the complexity of this 
phenomenon: even though the anti-Western, anti-Ukrainian and xenophobic 
views clearly dominate, they go along with the reluctance to support direct 
military intervention in the neighbouring country and even the view that 
cooperation with the West on certain issues is desirable (Gerber 2015; 
Sherlock 2014; Volkov 2015).
This multifaceted discussion has direct bearing on the central argument of 
this chapter. It demonstrates that it would be wrong to reduce the 
consideration of Russian society’s response to the Euromaidan revolution, the 
annexation of Crimea and the conflict in the Donbas to any individual factor. 
More specifically, while it must certainly be viewed through the prism of such 
concepts as nationalism and imperialism, these phenomena themselves are 
inherently contradictory and conditioned by radically dissimilar historical 
legacies. While imperialism is expansionist and inclusive, ethnic nationalism 
emphasises cultural homogeneity and thus treats even some Russian citizens 
as unwelcome strangers. The lasting impact of Soviet official internationalism 
makes the picture even more complex. Russian mass common sense is a mix 
of all these diverse elements: indeed, the concept of common sense itself, as 
it was introduced by Antonio Gramsci, presupposes a view of this 
phenomenon as necessarily protean, an incongruous combination of archaic 
and modern norms and values (Morton 2007, 62; Liguori 2009, 129). While 
the official ideology might be able, at times, to come up with a more 
consistent national identity narrative, it is also subject both to the demands of 
the political moment and the constraints imposed by the socially embedded 
popular views. As a result, many of the key political statements made by the 
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Russian leaders are deliberately ambiguous and open to multiple 
interpretations. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of national 
identity politics.
National Identity, Nationalism and Foreign Policy
It is common to point out the incompatibility between the ethnic, imperial and 
civic versions of Russian national identity (Tolz 1998, 2004; Shevel 2011). 
The first two appear to be conducive to some form of intervention in Ukraine, 
while the latter must, in principle, offer an alternative image of Russia and 
Russianness. Civic identity, however, has been in retreat since 2012, while 
the rise of ethnic nationalism was admittedly behind the perception of Russia 
as a divided nation and the image of ‘the Russian world’, used to legitimise 
the annexation of Crimea and the support for the Donbas insurgents (Zevelev 
2014; Feklyunina 2015). Nevertheless, as Marlene Laruelle demonstrates,
the status of this ‘divided nation’ line of argument remains 
instrumental: it is part of the discursive repertoire of Russia’s 
foreign policy, deployed whenever the Kremlin needs to 
penalize a neighbor for its geopolitical or political disloyalty, 
but it does not appear as a driver of routine foreign policy 
decisions. (2015b, 95)
At the same time, ethnic nationalism is difficult to reconcile with the political 
reality of a multi-ethnic nation created on the ruins of empire. The problem is, 
however, that neither of the available alternatives can achieve unconditional 
hegemony (Laruelle 2015c). While nostalgic memories about the Soviet and 
imperial past seem to dominate mass common sense (Kozlov 2016) and are 
a useful resource for the propaganda machine, it is hard to directly translate 
them into a national identity for today’s Russia.
A key, albeit not the only, reason for the limited utility of the imperial legacy is 
that the latter is, in itself, full of contradictions. Thus, the Soviet ‘affirmative 
action empire’ (Martin 2001) promoted the essentialised notion of ethnicity as 
the basis for nationhood, the principle of ethnic ownership of territories 
through the system of national autonomies (Miller 2007), the ideology of 
proletarian internationalism and equality of nations, combined, somewhat 
uneasily and with a varying degree of determination, with the imperial idea of 
ethnic Russians as ‘the first among the equals’. If one adds to that the 
prominence of Orthodox Christianity and the romanticised view of family and 
other ‘traditional values’ usually associated with the pre-1917 Russia, the 
resulting mixture becomes utterly eclectic and untranslatable into a clear-cut 
dividing line between the national ‘self’ and the ‘others’.
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While the broad set of patriotic values promoted by the Kremlin is shared by a 
vast majority of the population, no specific definition of what it means to be a 
patriot enjoys the same universally accepted status. As revealed in a recent 
study by Paul Goode, when confronted with direct and specific questions, 
Russian citizens find it hard to agree on the meaning of patriotism and have 
to deploy various strategies to eliminate apparent contradictions. Importantly, 
for Goode’s respondents, ‘ethnic nationalism – though common in 
discussions of patriotism – rarely figured into evaluations of foreign policy or 
the Kremlin’s policy toward Ukraine’ (Goode 2016). 
Opinion polls demonstrate that the Russian public is split down the middle on 
the question of whether Russians and Ukrainians are one people or two 
separate peoples, with the proportion of those who see Ukrainians as a 
separate nation steadily, but unevenly, increasing from 17 per cent in 2005 to 
43 per cent in May 2016. The approval of the idea that Russia and Ukraine 
must merge into a single state peaked at 28 per cent at the moment of 
Crimean annexation, before dropping below ten per cent by the end of 2014 
and remaining at more or less the same level ever since. On the contrary, a 
growing share of the population (36 per cent in May 2016) supports complete 
separation between the two states, with visas, customs controls and so on. In 
spite of this, those in favour of friendly relations with an independent Ukraine, 
without visas and customs barriers, have always remained a majority (Levada 
Centre 2016a). Generally, the Russian public does not support slogans of 
territorial expansion or intervention in the affairs of neighbouring states 
(Volkov 2015).
In other words, detailed studies looking at the relationship between the 
attitudes of the Russian masses and foreign policy, using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods and looking through the prism of public opinion as well 
as from the disciplinary perspective of international relations, tend to agree 
that Russian society remains divided with regard to any specific foreign policy 
issue. It would be equally wrong, however, to conclude that the masses are 
completely passive and ready to approve of any policy that the Kremlin might 
happen to select at any given moment. Any serious political choice still 
requires careful legitimation that needs to be constructed out of the existing 
eclectic elements of common sense.
Moscow’s bold decision to intervene in Ukraine stands out as an exception 
against the overall background of Putin’s presidency, which, at least prior to 
2014, had been associated with prioritising the status quo and avoiding direct 
confrontation (with an important exception of the 2008 war with Georgia, see 
Astrov 2011). This decision needs to be understood as a reaction to what was 
perceived as an acute crisis of the international system, which in this view 
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had lost its balance and required urgent action to prevent a genuine 
catastrophe. The point of origin of the crisis was easy to identify: predictably, 
it was seen as instigated by the irresponsible and expansionist West. The 
relationship with the West is important not just for Russian foreign policy 
makers, but for the society at large, and it needs to be explored in some 
detail.
Looking in the Western Mirror
What unites all definitions of the Russian nation examined in the previous 
section is that eventually they need the Western mirror to make sense in the 
wider context of the Russian political debate. The predominance of anti-
Western attitudes is registered by all sociological instruments (Herber 2015, 
Volkov 2015, Goode 2015) as well as by discourse-analytical tools (Hopf 
2016). It is also reflected in the recent conservative turn in Russian politics, 
ideology and legislation: such measures as the law banning ‘propaganda of 
homosexuality’, promotion of ‘traditional family values’ and other elements of 
Russia’s ‘spiritual sovereignty’ seem to pay off in the sense of consolidating 
the social base of the regime (Sharafutdinova 2015).
It was the broad anti-Western consensus that made the annexation of Crimea 
and the support for the Donbas separatists possible and in some sense 
inevitable. It was prepared by a wide-ranging transformation of the Russian 
security discourse: while in the early Putin years Russians were inclined to 
see the weakness of their own state as the primary security challenge, by the 
end of the decade the external threats were seen as paramount and the 
domestic issues were redefined accordingly (Snetkov 2015). Even though, as 
Kingsbury shows in her chapter, the relative prominence of various threats 
varied with time and depended on the Kremlin’s short-term priorities, Russian 
leadership never stopped worrying about subversive Western influence. 
Against the backdrop of the urban protest movement of 2011–2012, the 
Euromaidan came to be interpreted as anything but Ukraine’s domestic 
matter: it was seen as instigated by the West and as a repetition of a future 
‘colour revolution’ in Moscow.
This view, shared by the elites and by the pro-Putin masses alike, provided 
both the motivation and the legitimation for the dramatic foreign policy steps 
that followed. The Russian society sees itself as a victim of the West, which is 
aggressively promoting its own norms, institutions and values throughout 
post-Soviet space. The EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative, NATO 
enlargement, US plans to create anti-ballistic missile defence, the 
supranational jurisdiction of the European Court for Human Rights, efforts at 
democracy promotion, support for LGBT rights movement and human rights 
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in general are all seen as manifestations of Western expansionism. To defend 
its sovereignty, culture and independent moral standing, Russia needs to 
protect its sovereignty in all possible ways, but in particular by emphasising 
its unique values, strengthening ‘spiritual bonds’ within society (Putin 2012) 
and beefing up information security – a broad concept that includes control 
over media, social networks and private communications (Chernenko 2013; 
Morozov 2015, 103–134; Oliker 2016). If necessary, it also has to fight back 
to stave off the prospect of Ukraine’s NATO membership and to make sure 
there are no NATO military bases in Crimea.
As a result, positive identification with Europe, which was dominant in Russia 
in the 1990s, was replaced by an equally forceful othering. While in late 
1990s around two thirds of Russians believed their country must strive to 
become an EU member, this share dropped below 25 per cent after Putin’s 
re-election in 2012, and the attitude to the EU underwent an even more 
drastic reversal in March 2014 (Gudkov 2015a; Levada Centre 2016c). In 
other Levada Centre polls, 59 per cent of respondents said they do not 
consider Russia a European country (Akopov 2016), while only 17 per cent 
believe that Russia must develop in the same way as Europe (Levada Centre 
2016b, 46).
It would seem therefore that the Russian public shares the slogan ‘Russia is 
not Europe’, proclaimed by the Ministry of Culture in its April 2014 draft 
(Izvestia 2014). The reasoning behind this U-turn in identification is aptly 
summarised by the prominent nationalist historian Andrei Fursov:
who would want to associate oneself with the zone of today’s 
Europe, where traditional values are destroyed, 
homosexualism is on the rampage, there is a migration crisis 
etc. Europe today is, in essence, a dying zone, where the 
population is unable to defend its cultural and religious identity. 
It is a post-Christian and post-European world, a graveyard of 
European civilisation (quoted in Andreeva 2016).
As a radical intellectual who, in fact, had for a number of years been 
preparing the ground for the change of the official discourse, Fursov is 
probably more dismissive about Europe than most Russians would be. The 
same message, however, has been repeated by the official propaganda, 
which has exploited widely shared fears (xenophobia, homophobia etc.) in a 
situation where the defenders of individual rights and non-traditional lifestyles 
are silenced and sometimes even repressed (Sharafutdinova 2014; Stella and 
Nartova 2016).
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Yet it would be wise not to exaggerate the significance of this reversal. Firstly, 
as already pointed out, Russian society would still prefer to see relations with 
both the West and Ukraine improve (even though it blames the other side for 
that not happening). The ‘material’ aspects of the European way of life, such 
as economic prosperity and rule of law, still remain hugely attractive to the 
majority of the Russian citizens (Volkov 2015; Levada Centre 2016b, 47, 
130).
Secondly, and most importantly, even as the modality of the identification with 
Europe changes, Russian national identity discourse remains Eurocentric. 
While the overall success of the officially declared ‘pivot to Asia’ remains 
subject to a heated debate, identity-wise it has definitely not made Russia an 
Asian country. Likewise, there is no distinct ‘Eurasian’ identity so far, unless 
one would like to use this label to refer to the attempt to liberate the country 
from its normative and economic dependence on Europe – among other 
things, by building a Eurasian Union as an alternative integration project (cf. 
Morozova 2009; Laruelle 2015a; Schenk, this volume). 
The latter example, however, highlights the Eurocentric nature of the attempts 
to establish ‘Eurasia’ as a separate political space, as the Eurasian Union is 
explicitly modelled on the EU both in its design and in the surrounding 
discourse about the usefulness of economic integration (Dragneva and 
Wolczyk 2015). Speaking in more general terms, the only way to insist on the 
uniqueness of Russian ‘traditional values’ and ‘spirituality’ is by contrast with 
what is perceived as Western or European values. Both Europe and the West 
thus remain indispensable as key Others against which Russia’s identity 
continues to be defined (for a detailed analysis, see Morozov 2015, 118–134).
In sum, Russian society – both the elites and the masses – remains focused 
on Europe as the primary Other, which is seen as a geographical space 
where history unfolds and as a model (positive, negative or both) of social 
development and well-being. The Ukrainian conflict is viewed against this 
broad background, as resulting from the irresponsible expansionism of the 
West and as indisputable proof that Russia must remain firm in defending its 
interests and sovereignty. This is perhaps the main reason for the high levels 
of approval of the Crimean annexation and other foreign policy steps taken by 
the Kremlin since 2014: they are seen not as aggressive but as defensive, 
while the true aggressor is the West in its main incarnations as the US, NATO 
and the EU.
Conclusion 
Russian society remains fully behind President Putin’s leadership. In 
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particular, the decision to ‘reunite’ Crimea with Russia continues to enjoy 
overwhelming support, while all ensuing conflicts are blamed on the West. So 
far, this attitude has not been shattered by the economic crisis; confidence in 
the top leadership remains high in spite of omnipresent corruption, significant 
inflation eating away people’s real income and blatant inequality.
As this chapter has argued, this phenomenon cannot be explained by simply 
reducing it to the effect of the official propaganda. The propaganda is 
certainly massive, but it hardly creates any new meanings: rather, it feeds on 
the mass common sense by picking certain elements from the vast and 
incongruous stock of popular beliefs and blowing them up, sometimes 
completely out of proportion.
The way the ordinary Russians comprehend the conflict in and with Ukraine is 
fundamentally conditioned by nationalism, but this nationalism is not 
necessarily xenophobic and aggressive. Kingsbury is right to point out in her 
chapter that the xenophobic attitudes are to a large extent deliberately 
promoted by the Kremlin at certain junctures and tend to subside when such 
campaigns are over. Besides, xenophobes are often racist and thus worry 
much less about Ukrainians than about labour migrants from Central Asia. In 
more general foreign policy terms, Russians would prefer to have good 
neighbourly relations with Ukraine, the EU and the US, but they are not happy 
with how their neighbours treat Russia as a nation, as well as their fellow 
‘compatriots’ in post-Soviet states. While the concept of Russia as a divided 
nation is key to the understanding of Russian national identity and foreign 
policy, it is also extremely vague and open to a number of incompatible 
interpretations. It can be read in ethnic nationalist, imperialist and even civic 
terms, and all of these terms are present in the actual debate and policy 
documents. As a result, Russian nationalism can, in principle, be compatible 
with a rather broad range of actual policies.
Current Russian policy is both motivated and legitimised by the fear of 
Western expansionism. There is a serious and widely shared concern among 
Russians about the subversive effects of Westernisation for the spiritual 
integrity of the Russian nation. At the same time, Russian national identity 
discourse remains Eurocentric: all attempts to create an ‘alternative’ identity 
for Russia imply the need to explain how Russia is different from Europe. 
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